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a realistic picture of one continuing distressed area on the international
scene. The efforts of the authors should serve as a mild counterweight
to transient newspaper clippings, semi-official propaganda, and the
general exaggeration of opinionated amateurs. The four contributors
neither over-estimate the role, or potential, of international law nor
entirely discount it. Within their limited framework they have constructed a small symposium which distills the essentials of a large
problem while shedding light upon the field of international law as a
whole.
Eugene Mullins*
Lieutenant, JAG, U.S. Navy
J. D., University of Kentucky

Edited by
Morris D. Forkosch. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966. Pp. 667.
$17.50.

EssAYs iN LEGL HisToRY iN HONOR OF FE=Ix FRANxFuRTER.

Not long ago a perceptive critic described our times as "the century
of indigestible Symposia."
It happened just a century ago [he explained] that some forty German classical scholars presented their teacher, Friedrich Ritschl, with the
first Festschrift, the Symbola philologorum Bonnensium (1867). It was
soon to be followed by the Commentationes philologae with which the
sixtieth birthday of Theodor Mommsen was celebrated (1877) by nearly
eighty scholars including a dozen Italians, Frenchmen and Englishmen.
From the 1880's onwards Festgaben, Melanges, Miscellanies, Studi, have
been gradually spreading over all branches of learning throughout the
western world. Simultaneously, the range of occasions on which they
were presented has been multiplying: sixtieth, sixty-fifth, seventieth birthdays, retirement from an editorial office or a professorial chair, and the
pious memory of a deceased teacher provide most frequently the inducement for increasing further this flourishing academic retail business.
The time has come to take stock of the situation....

The above outburst, directed at the cataloguing problems that such
Festschriften volumes visit upon librarians and scholars using the
essays buried within them, failed to mention the difficulties they present to reviewers. But such difficulties exist and they are none the
less oppressive and foreboding. Confronted by a veritable smorgasbord, the reviewer can scarcely do more than describe the bill of
* The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and
do not necessarily represent the views of either the Kentucky Law Journal, the
Department of the Navy, or any governmental agency.
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fare, comment on one or two particularly tasty (or unsavory) dishes,

and gently excuse himself.
The book presently under review is a case in point: its range and
scope numb the mind. According to the Table of Contents, the book
consists of forty-one essays written by forty-two authors from eleven
different countries, plus a Foreword by Mr. Justice Harlan of the
Supreme Court. The six hundred pages of text are divided into four
parts which, together, promise a certain overall unity.
Part One, entitled What is Legal History?, contains a single essay
(of the same denomination) by Professor M. D. Forkosch, the editor
of the volume. Part Two, entitled The Use of Legal History, proposes
to "disclose somewhat the contemporary judicial use of legal history."
It consists of three subdivisions: the actual uses Justice Frankfurter
made of Legal History, as seen through the eyes of six of his quondam
clerks; the uses of Legal History in state courts, as described by the
Chief Justices of six states (Colorado, Florida, Maine, North Dakota,
Ohio, and Wyoming); and the relevance of Legal History to administrative agencies, specifically antitrust law, according to the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission.
Part Three is entitled simply Essays in Legal History and such it is:
sixteen essays on the widest range, both in space and time, of topics
conceivable. Thus they include (to give only a few samples) essays on
The Taiki Reform and the Sumeramikoso (a discussion of the way in
which a Seventeenth Century Reform Movement transformed the
Emperor of Japan from an honorific title into the absolute ruler of a
unified nation); The Golden Bull of Hungary and the Problem of
Human Rights (the Royal Documents issued by King Andrew II
in 1222 are compared with the almost simultaneously signed Magna
Carta by King John in England); Was loan of Arc Really a War
Leader? (in which the "Virgin Warrior" is found to have had no
military authority, beyond that of her own personality); and The
Spanish Watercourses of Texas (in which the current confusion in
Texas water law is traced to the post-Civil War lawyers' ignorance of
the Spanish law, which provided the historical, and rational, basis of
practices and customs still prevalent).
Part Four of the book, entitled Interrelationshipof Legal History
and the Social Sciences, consists of twelve essays by distinguished
scholars from fields other than law, among them Professors George
Boas, Crane Brinton, and Hans Kohn. These essays purport to demonstrate an "interrelationship" with such social sciences as History,
Literature, Labor History, Philosophy and Political Science.
Such, then, is the feast laid before us. The scholarly and pro-
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fessional reputations of the contributors, together with the intrinsic
interest of the wide variety of topics, must be assurance enough that
the book is a treasure trove of a sort. In a sense, that is perhaps all
a reviewer need say-if indeed it needed to be said.
Still, this volume is more than a collection of articles. It is a tribute
to a widely esteemed legal scholar and judge expressed in a formEssays in Legal History-assumedto be particularly appropriate to the
occasion. Hence it seems fair to inquire briefly into the nature of the
relationship between Justice Frankfurter and Legal History.
The remainder of this review will briefly consider what Justice
Frankfurter owed to (or gained from) his interest in Legal History
and, conversely, what Legal History owes to Justice Frankfurter.
Though all the essays in this Festschrift are dedicated to Justice
Frankfurter, few of them speak of him personally; and of those that
do, only one tells us anything significantly new about the relationship
between the Justice and Legal History. Most of the essays that do
touch on the subject stress his wide learning, and the awe and respect
it inspired among those with whom he worked closest, while pointing
out a few, specific cases in which he resorted to historical research to
throw new light on questions before the Court. But, interesting though
this all is, it serves simply to remind us of perhaps the best known
single trait of a very famous judge: Felix Frankfurter was a remarkably
learned man who frequently drew upon a rich storehouse of knowledge in writing his judicial opinions.
Unfortunately, however, these reiterations, although eloquent and
touching, are not very likely to persuade Frankfurter's detractors from
a strong conviction that his interest in history contributed mightily to
his undoing. To those who never fell under the "Frankfurter spell,"
(and they were more than a few) he seemed often to use his vast
erudition for petty displays of irksome pedantry. Far more gravely,
however, his critics believe than an exaggerated fondness for the past,
and other such niceties, caused him to forsake the spirit, indeed the
very essence, of the philosophy he professed to espouse. In Frankfurter's hands (they will say) the life-giving, icon-smashing expansiveness of Holmes's pragmatism became a strength-sapping, hairsplitting form of scholasticism.
One need not accept such a fanatically censorious view of Justice
Frankfurter's work to admit that there is some truth in the charge.
There is enough, in fact, to leave all but his most devoted admirers a
little uneasy about the unbroken chorus of praise in this volume about
his use of legal history. To many uncommitted readers it will appear
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very strange indeed that that which is here depicted as a crowning
virtue is elsewhere regarded as a besetting sin. Nonetheless, we may
fairly say that these essays, which are really too uncritical to help us
evaluate the significance of Frankfurter's interest in legal history, serve
a very useful purpose: precisely because of their uncritical praise of his
use of legal history they sharply raise the questions essential to a fair
appraisal of Justice Frankfurter and his work. What exactly was the
connection between Frankfurter's fondness for history and his controversial doctrine of "judicial restraint?" Did his interest in the past
gradually harness, and finally shackle, the young firebrand who rushed
to the defense of Sacco-Vanzetti and later stocked the New Deal with
activist lawyers? Again, and more generally, must a love of history
necessarily be ultimately destructive of a forward-looking, creative approach to the law?
Considering the last question, it seems, at first glance, that one
could posit, as an axiom, that the stronger one's interest in history the
greater one's resistance will be to social change. Certainly many of
the lawyers and legal scholars identified with "tradition," "custom,"
and "history" have been forcible defenders of established institutions.
Burke and Blackstone (both of whom the militantly anti-historical
Bentham attacked so vigorously) immediately come to mind. Likevise, the German "Historical School" of the Nineteenth Century, led
by Savigny and Niebuhr, quickly displayed a certain stubborn, not to
say reactionary, resistance to social change-an attribute shared with
its chief disciples abroad (Sir Henry Maine in England and James
Coolidge Carter in this country). By the same token, in the United
States, where (notwithstanding Carter, Ames and Woodbine to the
contrary) tradition has always been slightly suspect and the Past has
never been deeply honored, lawyers and judges have been freer and far
more willing to experiment with law and legal institutions than their
counterparts in more history-conscious nations. Therefore, the conclusion seems reasonable that one of the most powerful, and dangerous,
properties of "history" is its propensity to instill, in its practitioners and
devotees, a sense of tradition and continuity of growth that itself
militates against change and certainly against radical change.
Further, Frankfurter's own career illustrates the point perfectly: as
a lawyer and professor interested in the youngest (and therefore least
history-laden) branch of the law-Administrative Law-he was notably
concerned not with "preserving" traditions and values but with removing the injustices of his own day. However, as a member of the
tradition-ridden Supreme Court, he increasingly indulged his interest

KENTucKy LAw JouRNAL

[Vol. 56,

in the Past until, eventually, engulfed in history, he (like Blackstone,
Savigny & Co.) became ever more mindful of, if not obsessed with,
the need to preserve traditional institutions. This might be, as suggested above, the predictable result of his prolonged exposure to
history.
Such is not an untenable hypothesis. But one of the essays in this
collection offers a counter-thesis; in the opinion of this reviewer it is
worthy of special mention. In Justice FrankfurtersHistoricalSense, Professor M. R. Konvitz suggests that a love of history need not make
one a passive defender of the status quo, but might make one brilliantly creative. To prove his point, Konvitz examines the attitudes towards the past of two great poets, Goethe and T. S. Eliot. To Eliot, who
found in the past "a sense of the timeless as well as of the temporal,"
the study of history was necessarily a kinetic, creative search. "Tradition, [he wrote] cannot be inherited, and if you want it you must obtain it by great labor." To show how the search for one's own traditions
could lead to a state of mind that positively defied the status quo,
Professor Konvitz quotes Goethe's indignant denunciation of a proposed toast to "Memory."
I do not accept memory in your sense. You are merely expressing
yourself incorrectly. When we meet something great, beautiful, or important, we should not recall it afterwards from outside ourselves or
hunt it out. On the contrary, from the moment of meeting, it should
weave itself into our inner self, become one with it, create a new and
better self, and so continue to live on within us shaping and forming.
There is no past for which we should yearn. There is only the new,
which builds itself from the enlarged elements of the past. Genuine
yearning should always be productive and should strive for something
new and better.

Professor Konvitz asserts that Justice Frankfurter, as a judge, strove
to regain his (and our) tradition through history, and this quest forced
him (Frankfurter) to bring to the law, and to the Supreme Court, a
kind of poetic creativity akin, in quality and spirit, to that of Goethe
and Eliot. Therefore, without denying the well-known fact that Frankfirter was Holmes's disciple, (a subject explored in this volume in an
essay by President Barnett of Colgate University) Professor Konvitz
suggests another well-spring, as it were, from which the Justice's
inspiration and legal philosophy flowed. And if this were true, or to
the extent that it was true, everyone will agree that Frankfurter does,
indeed, owe a great debt to Legal History.
Such an idea is, at least to this reviewer, sufficiently novel to put a
familiar subject, Frankfurter, into a new and welcome light. Still, Pro-
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fessor Konvitz's thesis, although interesting and valuable, does not refute the proposition that the study of history propagates a warping
devotion to established institutions, tradition, and custom. For no one
would deny that some of the most history-conscious commentators
have been, while defenders par excellence of established institutions
against change, also brilliantly creative. (Such names as Bolingbroke,
de Maistre, and Burke come to mind.) If the prolonged study of the
past simply causes such writers to defend the past creatively, then the
proposition in question has hardly been contradicted. Thus the question still remains: did Frankfurter's devotion to history cause him
(however creatively) to divert the thrust of Legal Pragmatism from a
forward-looking concern about present injustices to the backvardtending defense of traditional values?
Perhaps the best refutation of the proposition that history inevitably orients one towards the past is to be found in a comparison
of Holmes' and Frankfurter's relationship to Legal History. While
comparisons are said to be odious, history (as Maitland said) necessarily involves comparisons. And the comparison of these two jurists
in this regard should be instructive.
Holmes was a distinguished legal historian of international reputation. Frankfurter was not. Holmes spent the formative years of his
professional life-from the age of twenty to forty-as a legal scholar
working in a library with historical sources. Frankfurter spent the
equivalent years of his life as a government official dealing with current, practical problems, or as a professor teaching Administrative Law,
a new, forward-looking branch of the law. In both cases his contact
with historical sources must have been, at most incidental to his
metier. In other words, Holmes -went from the ivory tower (and history) to the Supreme Court; Frankfurter went from the world of
politics and current affairs to the same bench.
If a long and close association with history does in fact have the
propensity to constrict the outlook and to orient the mind towards the
past, it would surely seem that Holmes would have been far more
cautious and tradition-oriented than Frankfurter. However, this was
not so, and why not?
Possibly, the study of history carries no inevitable propensities with
it at all, and such propensities as it does entail are attributable not to
history but to the historian. From this premise would follow that those
who are Holmeses will be Holmeses whatever they happen to study,
and likewise those named Frankfurter, Smith or Jones. But this answer,
though to some extent valid, is too easy to be altogether satisfactory. As
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an alternative we might consider the possibility that the method,
timing, and circumstances under which one turns to history makes the
critical difference in one's attitude towards the past.
Once again the Frankfurter-Holmes comparison is suggestive. The
most obvious difference between these two jurists in this respect is that,
as a judge and legal philosopher, Holmes grew out of, while Frankfurter grew into, Legal History. And it may be that the mature lawyer
who turns to history will have a greater propensity to defer to the
past than one who has had a life long familiarity with it.
Thus Holmes, the legal historian, had laboriously worked out his
own conclusions about the origins of the common law and the nature
of its slow and tortured development that provided the basis of the
philosophy of law he expounded so brilliantly as a Judge. That philosophy depended, at bottom, on a sharp distinction between "historical"
and "jurisprudential" problems. To Holmes, '"istorical" problems stemmed from the continued survival of legal prescriptions after the reasons
for their being had ceased to exist; "jurisprudential" problems were the
manifestations of eternal, essentially unalterable conditions of human
life. The former could be solved through prining and intelligent experimentation, which an indiscriminate devotion to the past could only
hamper; the latter admitted of no final solution, though knowledge
of history could teach the terrible necessity of protecting men from the
selfishness and irrationalities of man. Thus Holmes could see clearly,
and distinguish sharply between, situations in which group action
should be encouraged from those in which it should be restrained.
With the confidence born of a thorough understanding of law and its
relation to history, he could confidently urge the chopping away of
legal anachronisms (such as the Rule in Shelley's Case), while standing
four-square against the atempts by the government, however sovereign,
to curtail the right of the outcast Bolshevik to speak freely. Although he
decried the "certitude of certainty," much of his own greatness lay in
his crisp certainty as to where change in the law was, and was not,
permissible. His command of Legal History gave him the knowledge
and the philosophy which made his certainty possible.
Frankfurter, by contrast, had no such command of Legal History.
Perhaps for that reason, he never managed to distinguish with enough
confidence to be convincing between "historical" and "jurisprudential"
problems. Thus many persons, and especially Chief Justice Stone,
believed that Frankfurter, in the celebrated "Flag Salute" case, treated
freedom of speech, one of the basic safeguards against the tyranny of
the majority, as a temporal arrangement subject to change from time
to time as the legislature deemed necessary. In other words, Frank-
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furter confused what Holmes would have called a jurisprudential problem with an historical one-and allowed change where Holmes would
presumably have resisted it.
By the same token it may well be that in the reapportionment
cases, Colegrove v. Green and Baker v. Carr, Frankfurter in reality
vested certain temporal arrangements, i.e., voting districts, with a
sanctity that Holmes, with a greater sensitivity to the "felt necessities"
of the times, would have boldly stricken down as a political anachronism. Of course we cannot be sure. And it may be that Frankfurter's dissents will, in the future, come to be valued as solemn warnings from a highly placed official against a pernicious trend. Even so,
they do not have an unmistakable ring of truth. Holmes had the
capacity for making one feel that he was always talking about the
crucial issue at the critical time. With Frankfurter one is never quite
sure.
What I have tried to say is that Frankfurter's natural milieu, as a
lawyer or scholar, was not the past and, consequently, his greatest
skills were not those of an historian. To the contrary, his training and
experience as a lawyer, political administrator, and professor had
prepared him to deal with the present, with current problems demanding immediate action. And in truth, few men in this century have
been better equipped to deal with such problems. But his successes in
these respects did not depend upon a profound understanding of
history or a sophisticated use of the past. Indeed, it is arguable that his
least satisfactory opinions were those in which he tried to be what he
was not, i.e., a legal historian. Moreover, (it is further arguable) that
by so doing he made legal history what it is not, and should not bea substitute for a philosophy of law.
What then was the relationship between Frankfurter and Legal
History? It was a marriage of convenience, and like most such marriages, it had its inconveniences.
Whatever use Justice Frankfurter may have made of Legal History,
he is now the property, so to speak, of Legal History. Consequently,
we might properly ask what Legal History owes to him.
Obviously, every Supreme Court justice is, ex officio, an historical
figure. Thus Justices Campbell and Shiras as well as Marshall and
Story, have their claims to fame-and their biographers. So, certainly,
will Justice Frankfurter. But beyond that it is not for us to say what
place future legal historians will accord him. We can, however,
hazard the guess that they will find him a genuine enigma.
As already indicated, Frankfurter is something of an enigma even
to his contemporaries. Some (like the contributors to this Festschrift)
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virtually idolize him, while others (like Professor Fred Rodell of Yale)
literally abhor him. Even so, the issue, insofar as there is an issue, of
Frankfurter's merit is waged between these two, almost fanatical
extremes. But, (and this is the remarkable point) supposedly, to the
vast majority of the populace there is no issue at all: Frankfurter was,
quite simply, the Supreme Court. With the exception of Holmes and
one or two others, probably no individual since John Marshall has so
completely personified in lay eyes that institution. This remarkably
widespread assumption will be the enigma which will puzzle future
historians.
Frankfurter will become a genuine historical problem only in a
world in which the aura of greatness surrounding his name at Harvard
Law Schools has faded into the desiccated, feckless deference now perfunctorily accorded such worthies as Nathan Dane, Simon Greenleaf,
and Theophilus Parsons. Such is a world in which the term "New
Dealer," like that of "Lollard," "Leveller," and "Philosophical Radical,"
has become more intelligible to school boys than to the electorate and
in which the letters "F.F." have lost their legendary significance and
magical effect to the Supreme Court bar, staff, and judges. Then, and
only then, will an historian be sufficiently puzzled by the repeated appearance of the name Felix Frankfurter to ask himself seriously why,
and how it came to be, that this individual commanded such incredible respect among his contemporaries. To answer the Question,
the bewildered scholar will undoubtedly be forced to examine the
record, Frankfurter's surviving work.
What the historian will find and what he will conclude cannot
be said. However, he will have difficulty accounting for Frankfurters
extraordinary fame by the more conventional criteria for measuring the
greatness" of judges. For example, he will find no clear cut, coherent,
logically consistent legal or political philosophy running throughout
Frankfurter's writings. Even today difficulty is encountered in summarizing succinctly Frankfurter's legal or political philosophy. Compare the other "great" judges on this point. Legal historians could
easily identify the "Common Law" with Lord Coke, "Federalism"
with Marshall, and "Pragmatism" with Holmes; given subsequent
political and legal developments, scholars could reasonably "find"
links between the ideas of these judges and the course of history.
Hence the accolade of "greatness" fell upon their shoulders. Frankfurter scarcely ranks with them on this count.
Another conventional criterion of judicial greatness has been legal
scholarship. The fame of Justice Blackstone (despite Scott v. Shephard
and Perryn v. Blake) derives from his Commentaries; in this country,
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Chancellor Kent and Justice Story are remembered largely for the same
reason. Likewise, most of our other "great" judges have also been distinguished authors. Justice Holmes's lectures on The Common Law,
alone, would have assured him a singular place in our legal history.
To speak only of the better known jurists of Frankfurter's own
generation, Cardoza's Nature of the judicial Process and, to a lesser
extent, Brandeis's Other People's Money certainly give them an enduring claim to fame, quite independent of their labors on the bench.
Again by contrast, one searches Frankfurter's bibliography in vain for
a publication, or publications of outstanding, enduring quality. His
books and articles scarcely rank with those of the really great scholar
-judges.
Still another conventional criterion of judicial greatness is being
an outstanding opinion writer. Lord Mansfield, in England, and Marshall, Holmes, and Cardoza in this country, were most conspicuous in
this respect; only to a slightly less degree were Lemuel Shaw of
Massachusetts and, in modem times, Learned Hand. They graced a
bench for many decades and, by the sheer force of their minds, left an
unmistakable imprint on the shape and spirit of the law of their day.
Their opinions, because of the very names of the authors, seemed to
carry greater weight with the bench and bar. Was such the same with
Frankfurter? Perhaps.
Undoubtedly, opinion writing was Frankfurter's forte. But, good as
he undoubtedly was, the legal historian will, nonetheless, find it awkward to explain Frankfurter's remarkable reputation on this ground
when he compares, for example, the powerful, often crisp and distinctive opinions of such lesser acclaimed jurists as Chief Justice Stone
and Justice Jackson, to mention only two of his deceased colleagues.
Certainly, several of Frankfurter's brethren on the bench seemed to be
his equal, or very nearly so, as an opinion writer. Yet none of them
rivaled him as a symbol of the Court. Thus, his reputation did not
depend, certainly not wholly, upon the sheer excellence of his opinions.
The point of these remarks is not to suggest that Frankfurter somehow hoodwinked the public or reaped a harvest of undeserved acclaim.
To the historians of the future the reality of the acclaim will not, indeed cannot, be gainsaid. The fact that it cannot be accounted for by
conventional criteria will only serve to make Frankfurter all the more
interesting to the future; presumably it will force historians to go beyond conventional criteria of judicial greatness in search of the still
unperceived ones he did fulfill. Of this we can be certain: when the
historians have answered the riddle of Felix Frankffurter-when they
can satisfactorily explain how a judge came to personify, in so many
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eminently discerning eyes, the United States Supreme Court without
having espoused a distinctive legal or political philosophy, without
having written formidable treatises on the nature of law, without
having been an incomparably brilliant opinion writer, they will have
understood the mid-Twentieth Century United States better than we
do ourselves.
Such, in my opinion, is the most enduring link between Justice
Frankfurter and Legal History. Perhaps this gives us a clue to his true
greatness. Who but a crown prince of gadflies could leave a conundrum,
such a superbly significant conundrum as a legacy?
Calvin Woodard
Professor of Law
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Virginia

F_ PREss AN FAm TlLm.By Donald M. Gillmor. Washington, D. C.:
Public Affairs Press, 1966. Pp. 254. $6.00.
For many years the conflict between free press and fair trial has
been a fundamental issue in our society. The urgency of the problem
has increased greatly in the last few decades due to technological
improvements increasing the speed and impact of the communications
media. Newspapers, with photographers and reporters working quietly
inside the courtroom, can reach a nationwide audience within a few
hours of a trial. Television and radio can broadcast the highlights of a
trial into homes all over the country. Through these means the entire
population of an area can feel intimately involved in courtroom
dramas. Thus, the possibilities of both a "quick" and "public" trial are
at the same time enhanced and enormously complicated.
Through short, readable, and fairly graphic chapters, Gillmor
develops the various aspects of the problem. In dramatic recapitulations of the Sheppard, Oswald, "Mad Dog" Irvin and similar episodes,
the author sets the stage and roughly defines the issues to be explored. In a broad sense these are two:
1. To what extent does pre-trial publicity prejudice the entire
population making it impossible to draw an impartial jury?
2. To what extent does trial publicity filter back to members of the
jury and so corrupt the verdict?
Justice often can be subverted by men on all sides who are simply

